Northern Ireland: Independent Monitoring Commission

Baroness Amos: My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has made the following Statement.
	Under Section 11(1) of the Northern Ireland (Monitoring Commission etc.) Act 2003, I am required to lay before Parliament each year a report on the operation of the agreement between the British and Irish Governments that established the Independent Monitoring Commission and the operation of the relevant provisions inserted into the Northern Ireland Act 1998.
	The first annual report, published today, covers the 12-month period to 18 September 2004. The report sets out the steps that have been taken to establish the IMC in accordance with the agreement between the two Governments.
	The report refers to the two IMC reports published in the reporting period, and describes the actions taken as a consequence of those reports. The various documents and reports referred to in my annual report are all in the public domain.
	The IMC continues to fulfil an important and valuable role in Northern Ireland and I am grateful to the commissioners for their dedication and efforts to date.

Iraq: Casualty Estimates

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: This Statement provides a response to the article "Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey" published in the Lancet on 29 October concerning civilian casualties since the beginning of military action in Iraq in March 2003.
	The Security Context
	It is important to recall the background to the current violence in Iraq. In the period of major combat activities in Iraq between the coalition and Iraqi forces loyal to Saddam Hussein, there were inevitably civilian casualties caused by military action by both sides. Every effort was made, on the part of the coalition, to minimise the civilian casualties as required by international humanitarian law.
	Casualties—civilian and military—which have occurred since major combat activities ended on 1 May 2003 have done so directly as a result of those determined to undermine the political process. Security Council Resolution 1546, adopted on 8 June 2004, noted the request of the Iraqi Interim Government that the multi-national force should remain to help the sovereign Government of Iraq to ensure security and reaffirmed its authorisation on that basis. The multi-national force has been acting under that mandate, in support of the Iraqi security forces, to ensure the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. The mandate specifically authorises action against terrorists.
	The Iraqi Government continue to face a violent insurgency. Every day brings grim evidence that the targets of this insurgency are not merely a supposed occupation force. They include members of Iraqi civil institutions and security forces, ordinary Iraqis and foreigners working to build a better future for Iraq. They include children killed when co-ordinated bombs were detonated near a water treatment plant in Baghdad, Iraqi army trainees and police butchered with premeditation and foreigners executed in front of the cameras. The scale of the threat has prompted international humanitarian agencies to close their operations in the country.
	In those many parts of Iraq where there have been no terrorist incidents, there have been no casualties. If the terrorists and insurgents gave up their campaign, the violence in Iraq would cease.
	However, while the insurgents continue in their attempts to destroy the political process leading to a constitutionally elected government, and to attack those rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure and public services, the multi-national force will support the efforts of the Iraqi Government and security forces to defeat them. That may include military action if there is no alternative.
	The multi-national and Iraqi forces continue to act so as to minimise civilian casualties. This is despite the fact that the insurgents have shown no compunction in using mosques, schools and hospitals as defensive bases. The MNF is currently providing food and other supplies to civilians in the Fallujah area, and working closely with the Iraqi Ministry of Health to ensure medical supplies reach there.
	The Iraqi Government and their international partners remain committed to defeating the terrorists and insurgents in Iraq. I pay tribute to all those who are working to build a safe and democratic country.
	The Legal Context
	The Lancet study suggests that there is an obligation deriving from Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention for the multi-national force (MNF) itself to have a reckoning of the number of civilian casualties it has caused. There is nothing in Article 27, or elsewhere in the Fourth Geneva Convention, to support this suggestion.
	The basic obligations under international humanitarian law as regards civilian casualties in an armed conflict are set out in Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions, which also reflects customary international law. In particular, indiscriminate attacks are prohibited, and this includes any "attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated". This obligation under international humanitarian law has been fully complied with by the United Kingdom in respect of all military operations in Iraq.
	Casualty Estimates
	In many cases it would be impossible to make a reliably accurate assessment either of the civilian casualties resulting from any particular attacks or of the overall civilian casualties of a conflict. This is particularly true in the conditions that exist in Iraq. However, since 5 April 2004 the Iraqi Ministry of Health has sought to collect casualty data. Explaining the procedure, the Iraqi Minister of Health stated on 29 October: "Every hospital reports daily the number of civilians (which may include insurgents) who have been killed or injured in terrorist incidents or as a result of military action. All casualties are likely to be taken to hospital in these circumstances except for some insurgents (who may fear arrest) and those with minor injuries. The figures show that between 5 April 2004 and 5 October 2004, 3,853 civilians were killed and 15,517 were injured. I am satisfied that this information is the most reliable available." We share this view. The Ministry's figures do not of course cover the whole of the period since military action was taken, but they do include the months of April and August, when casualty figures were particularly high.
	Other figures are proposed by NGOs. www.iraqbodycount.net, an NGO-based website, provides a running estimate of civilian casualties based on media and other reports. This has suggested that from March 2003 to the present there have been between 14,284 and 16,419 civilian deaths. This is an estimate relying on media reports, and which we do not regard as reliable. It includes civilian deaths at the hands of terrorists as well as of the coalition forces. It relies on media reporting to decide who is a civilian and who is not. It does help to show however that the Iraqi Ministry of Health figures are not the only ones to differ widely from the Lancet's estimate.
	The Lancet
	The article estimates that between 8,000 and 194,000 more people died following the invasion of Iraq than previous rates of mortality would have predicted, with the "most likely" figure being 98,000 extra deaths. 73 of the total of 142 deaths recorded by the survey in the period since the invasion are judged to have occurred through violence from the coalition forces or from terrorists. Other deaths recorded were the result, for example, of heart attacks or road accidents, not of coalition or terrorist action.
	The Lancet's researchers acknowledge that they encountered no evidence of widespread wrongdoing on the part of individual multi-national force (MNF) soldiers on the ground.
	The design of the Lancet study and its statistical methodology passed the process of peer review before publication and is similar to that followed in cases where the data are difficult to obtain. But that should not mask the fact that any methodology critically depends on the accuracy of the data subject to its analysis.
	As the authors of the study themselves acknowledge, it was carried out under exceptionally difficult conditions which in particular restricted the size of the samples surveyed. As the Lancet article says, the estimate of deaths is based on an extrapolation from an increase from 46 deaths in 110,538 person-months before the conflict, to 142 deaths in 138,439 person-months after the conflict. Of those, 61 deaths were attributed to coalition forces, most of them in Fallujah, a sample which the authors admit is an "extreme statistical outlier".
	The figures derived from the survey's data on Fallujah would have resulted in an estimated 200,000 excess deaths within Fallujah alone over the past 18 months. This would amount to almost two-thirds of the total population of the town—which is just not credible. The authors of the study understandably discounted the data. In general they have noted that the data on which they based their projections was of "limited precision". This limited precision is reflected in the very large range which they use for their estimate of excess mortality (8,000-194,000). Although the levels of probability vary across its range, any figure within this range is consistent with the data.
	We doubt the survey's attribution of 61 violent deaths to action by coalition forces. Only two deaths are attributed in the survey to "anti-coalition forces". This is an astonishingly small proportion of those said to have died from violence, given the large numbers of Iraqis we know have died in individual incidents at the hands of terrorists. Since 58 of the 61 deaths attributed to coalition forces were said to have been caused by "helicopter gunships, rockets or other forms of aerial weaponry", it cannot have been possible for the families in every case to have known for certain who was responsible. It is also possible that they would have been afraid to have blamed the deaths of their relatives on the insurgents. The authors also acknowledge that "many of the Iraqis reportedly killed by US forces could have been combatants". The greatest increase in deaths which they report was among 15 to 59 year-old men, while for instance among the elderly in the survey there was effectively no increase in the death rate at all.
	Other questions about the Lancet study relate to the significant differences between its estimate and other evidence, notably the figures on casualties produced by the Iraqi Ministry of Health and quoted above.
	If the Lancet survey is accurate we could have expected Iraqi Ministry of Health figures, compiled by hospitals, to show many more times the number of people killed and wounded over that period than they in fact do. Hospitals in Iraq have no obvious reason to under-report the number of dead and injured. The Lancet article does not explain this discrepancy.
	So while recognising the bravery and professionalism of those conducting the Lancet study, the Government do not accept its central conclusion, and continue to believe that the most reliable figures for casualties in Iraq are those provided by Iraqi hospitals to the Iraqi Ministry of Health.

Royal Military Police: Deaths atAl Majarr Al Kabir

Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Geoffrey Hoon) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	The appalling incident at Al Majarr Al Kabir on 24 June 2003 resulted in one of the most serious losses suffered by British forces since the beginning of operations in Iraq. It was felt deeply within the British Army, in particular the Royal Military Police, and struck a grievous blow to the families of the six soldiers. From the moment news of the incident came through we have been doing all that we can, in conjunction with the Iraqi authorities, to bring the perpetrators of this crime to justice. We have also been working hard to find out as much as we can about the circumstances leading up to deaths of the six soldiers, to ensure that if there were lessons for the service then these would be learnt for the benefit of future operations.
	The service board of inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the six soldiers has now completed its work. This inquiry is fundamentally about learning lessons to prevent a recurrence. It is not about attributing blame or calling individuals to account. These are governed by separate procedures. It is also entirely internal in nature. However, we recognise that the families of the six soldiers have a close and fundamental interest in the board's work and its findings. We have therefore sought to keep the families as closely informed as we can on both these processes. To this end, representatives of the bereaved families are today receiving a briefing from the board president, following which I will meet them to hear their views and discuss any outstanding concerns they may have.
	We recognise, too, that there is a wider parliamentary and public interest at stake, which is why we have taken the unusual step of providing a summary of the board of inquiry's findings for Parliament and the press. I am therefore making arrangements for a copy of the board's opinion, findings and recommendations, together with the overlaid opinions of the chain of command, to be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.
	So as not to prejudice the criminal investigation, the board was instructed to look at the events leading up to the incident in which the six soldiers died and not to examine the particular circumstances of their deaths. The board of inquiry was an exhaustive internal review conducted for service reasons and its report is an open and frank account of the events of 24 June 2003. The board made 10 recommendations (a further two were subsequently added by the chain of command) concerning military policies and procedures. Most of these have been accepted and will be implemented as a matter of priority.
	The board found that the incident at Al Majarr Al Kabir was a surprise attack, which could not reasonably have been predicted. The board also found that a number of factors may potentially have had a bearing on the deaths of the six soldiers, including issues relating to ammunition, communications and command relationships within the battle group to which the Royal Military Police platoon was attached. The board was not, however, able to state that any of these factors, either in isolation or in combination directly determined the six soldiers' fate.
	I am aware that some of the families have been critical of the Army's response to the deaths of the six soldiers. I hope they recognise the board's work for the thorough and detailed review that it is. I hope, too, that they now have a much better understanding of the events leading up to the death of their loved ones and the wider context in which the events occurred, and can take some comfort from this.
	The families will shortly receive full copies of the board's documentation. A separate meeting will be arranged with the board president once the families have had a chance to digest this detail. This will be a further opportunity for the families to ask questions and to increase their understanding of the circumstances surrounding this tragic incident.

Defence Intelligence and Security Centre:Key Targets

Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Minister of State for Defence (Mr Adam Ingram) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	The Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC) is the centre for defence intelligence training in the UK. CE DISC is responsible for training authorised personnel in intelligence, security and information support disciplines and maintaining an operational capability. The key targets for the agency for the 12 months from April 2004 are:
	Key Target 1: Training Quantity and Efficiency
	To produce trained personnel in accordance with defence requirements, while reducing wastage by 1 per cent in financial year 2004-05.
	Key Target 2: Training Quality
	To ensure that training complies with defence training quality standards and customer requirements.
	Key Target 3: Operations
	To satisfy all operational tasking.
	Key Target 4: Change Programme
	To deliver process improvement milestones in accordance with the owner's directive.

Defence Geographic and Imagery Intelligence Agency: Key Targets

Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Minister of State for Defence (Mr Adam Ingram) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	DGIA is responsible for meeting defence needs for responsive, accurate geospatial and imagery intelligence. The key targets for the agency for the 12 months from April 2004 are:
	Key Target 1: Provision of Imagery Intelligence
	To meet defence needs for imagery intelligence against an imagery intelligence exploitation programme agreed with customers.
	Key Target 2: Provision of Geospatial Intelligence
	To meet defence needs for geospatial intelligence against a geospatial intelligence programme agreed with customers.
	Key Target 3: Provision of Deployable Functions
	To provide force elements at a level of operational readiness agreed with customers.
	Key Target 4: Provision of Training Capability
	To meet defence needs for geographic training against a geospatial training plan agreed with customers.
	Key Target 5: Efficiency
	To improve the efficiency of production within DGIA by 1 per cent in 2004-05.

Defence Storage and Distribution Agency:Key Targets

Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Minister of State for Defence (Mr Adam Ingram) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	Key targets have been set for the chief executive of the Defence Storage and Distribution Agency (DSDA) for financial year 2004-05. The targets are as follows:
	:TITLE3:Key Target 1
	To meet the customers' requirements as negotiated and agreed in business agreements (BAs). This key target is broken down into two sub-targets:
	Key target 1a: For explosive materiel; to supply 95 per cent of available maintained munitions within demand timescales.
	Key target 1b: 95 per cent of the number of issues of non-explosive materiel to consumers, as forecast and agreed in BAs, to meet that element of the supply chain pipeline time (SCPT) for which DSDA has a responsibility.
	Key target 1c: To process within limits, agreed with each individual customer, 98 per cent of all receipts that conform to the specifications laid down in the contract and/or materiel regulations.
	:TITLE3:Key Target 2
	To achieve an average 5 per cent reduction in the unit cost of output.
	:TITLE3:Key Target 3
	The value of inventory written off as a result of DSDA's actions to be less than the levels agreed with each business agreement. This key target is broken down into two sub-targets:
	Key target 3a: The value of explosive materiel written off as a result of DSDA's action to be less than 0.02 per cent.
	Key Target 3b: The value of non-explosive materiel written off as a result of DSDA's action to be less than levels agreed within each specific customer supplier agreement.

DTI Five-Year Programme

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Ms Hewitt) has made the following Written Statement.
	The Department of Trade and Industry five-year programme, Creating Wealth from Knowledge, was published today. Copies have been placed in the Libraries of both Houses and are available from the DTI website at: www.dti.gov.uk/fiveyearprogramme.html
	On 18 September 2003 I published the DTI strategy, setting out the measures which my department will take to raise productivity in the UK and achieve our vision of prosperity for all. The five-year programme reaffirms the priorities of the DTI strategy. It sets out how the UK will develop a strong, modern knowledge-based economy which can meet the challenges posed by the rapidly emerging economies and new technologies.
	The five-year programme recognises that we are building on solid foundations. Living standards have gone up, on average, by almost 3 per cent a year since 1997. For the first time in nearly half a century the UK has the best growth and employment record of the G7, and we have overtaken France to become the fourth-largest economy in the world. However, our world is undergoing a transformation; China is set to be the largest economy in the world within a generation; India produces 3 million highly skilled graduates a year; the new central and eastern European democracies, with wage costs which are 10 per cent of ours, have joined the EU. In order for the UK to maintain and build on our strong economic position, we will have to respond to this changing environment.
	The five-year programme argues that innovation through the application of science and technology, with highly skilled people, is the key to our country's future prosperity. In the modern world, the countries that create a climate where innovation flourishes will succeed. Those that do not will struggle. The UK already has many strengths to succeed: world class universities; a tradition of science and research; a dynamic and flexible labour market; and world-beating businesses which make use of new technologies and provide high value-added services.
	My department is at the cutting edge of our country's ambition to create wealth from knowledge. Our five-year programme outlines the means by which we will achieve this, working with other departments, business, trade unions and other partners at home, in Europe and globally. It sets out the policies needed, over the next five years, to stimulate the industries and jobs of the future through science and innovation; to create new partnerships with industry to promote enterprise; to deliver a new approach to regulation; and to lead the drive for reform in Europe.